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Previous literature concludes that replacing wage taxation by taxes on a fixed factor or its 
rents benefits future generations. However, the effects of such steady-state gains on the 
transition generations have been left open. In this paper, we show that taxation of rents may 
also increase utility of the current generation provided tax revenues are earmarked to reduce 
wage taxes. In particular, a shift in the tax mix may yield an intergenerational Pareto-
improvement when the initially prevailing tax mix is sufficiently skewed towards wage 
taxation. 
 
JEL Code: H22, E62, F02. 






Center for Economic Studies (CES) 







University of Helsinki 
Department of Economics 








Rent taxation in￿ uences resource allocation through various channels. Feldstein (1977) shows
that a rent tax promotes capital accumulation. The rent tax lowers the price of the ￿xed
factor (e.g. land), which reallocates a higher fraction of savings in the households￿portfolio
choice to the accumulation of physical capital. Consequently, welfare of steady state gen-
erations rises.1 The e⁄ect is, of course, non-existent in a small open economy in which the
household portfolio choice and domestic capital accumulation are disconnected (e.g. Eaton,
1988). As shown by Petrucci (2006), rent taxation may still be bene￿cial in a small open
economy provided households endogenously supply labor. For instance, when rent tax rev-
enues are spent on the reduction of distortionary wage taxes, labor supply increases; an
e⁄ect which is welcomed by steady state generations. They enjoy a lower wage tax without
incurring a drop in the price of their land holdings. The latter cost of rent taxation is borne
by transitional generations. The intriguing question is whether the transition generation
are able to bene￿t from rent taxation. Petrucci (2006) analyzes the e⁄ect on steady-state
generations, leaving the e⁄ect on transition generations, alive at the time of the reform,
open.
One instrument to accomplish an intergenerational Pareto-improvement might be an
intergenerational transfer, such as social security payments or public debt. Instead, this
paper analyzes whether the positive welfare e⁄ects of rent taxation extend to transition
generations in the absence of these public transfer institutions. We show that market-based
adjustments may, in fact, realize an intergenerational welfare improvement. Concretely,
provided the initially prevailing level of wage taxes is su¢ ciently high, introducing rent taxes
to reduce wage taxes increases the sum of rental income and land value of the transitional
1Among others, Calvo et al. (1979), Chamley and Wright (1987) and Ihori (1990) analyze re￿nements of
the e⁄ect.
1generation. The rationale is that the rise in labor supply raises the marginal productivity of
land which capitalizes in the market price of land. As such, earmarking rent tax revenues
is helpful in realizing an intergenerational Pareto-improvement. Rent taxation induces a
forward intergenerational transfer from transitional generations to steady state generations.
The earmarking simultaneously yields a backward, market-based reaction in asset values,
which compensates, possibly to a full extent, transitional generations.2
The importance of the capitalization mechanism for intergenerational policy is also ana-
lyzed in Rangel (2005). Rangel assumes an economy that lasts for two periods and has two
overlapping generations. The older generation owns land and sells it to the younger gen-
eration in the second period. There are intergenerational public expenditures (e.g. public
infrastructure) that bene￿t the younger generation in the second period. This investment is
more e¢ cient to do in the ￿rst period. Taxation is restricted to either income taxation or
land taxation, and taxes are paid in the ￿rst period by the older generation and in the second
period by the younger generation. The older generation can also use public debt; thereby
expropriating the younger generation. Rangel shows that income taxes yield a less tight link
between the ￿scal treatment of future generations and the current land price. The reason
is that changes in income taxes a⁄ect land price only to the extent that demand for land
changes through income e⁄ects, while land taxes, which are levied in the second period to
top up the investment of the old generation or to repay debt accumulated in the ￿rst period,
capitalize directly into land prices. Rangel concludes that restricting tax instruments to land
taxes, rather than allowing for income taxes, would improve e¢ ciency in the provision of
intergenerational goods.
Our analysis di⁄ers from Rangel (2005) in three ways. First, Rangel assumes that the
2Rangel (2003) analyzes how the provision of forward and backward intergenerational goods (e.g. old-age
social security and education) intertwine so as to ensure the political viability of intergenerational transfers.
Here, we establish a backward link across generations by means of the market mechanism. Rangel (2003)
analyzes an economy in which incomes are exogenous and there is no land or any other ￿xed factor.
2income tax base is exogenously given, i.e. there is no endogenous labor supply, and that
the level of public expenditures is endogenous. We assume, instead, that labor supply is
endogenous, and public expenditures are exogenous. Thus, Rangel analyzes the allocation
of given resources between private consumption and public expenditures, while we analyze
the e¢ cient ￿nancing of given public expenditures when total production is endogenous and
labor supply responds to the way taxes are collected. Second, we assume that the government
has no access to lump-sum taxes but can only tax wages and rental income, while Rangel
allows government to levy either lump-sum taxes or land taxes. Third, Rangel focuses on
the interest con￿ ict between di⁄erent generations, recommending constitutional restrictions
to taxing only land to protect future generations. We ￿nd, instead, that there is scope for
an intergenerational consensus: current and future generations have to a certain extent a
joint interest in relying on land taxes rather than income taxes.
The presence of intergenerational trade need not always improve e¢ ciency. Poutvaara
(2003) shows that the presence of intergenerational trade in a ￿xed factor of production that
is complementary to human capital may result in overprovision of public education from the
e¢ ciency point of view. In Poutvaara (2003), the current and future working-age generations
have an option to decide whether to pay taxes to provide education publicly to the younger
generation, or leave investment in education to be decided privately. There are no taxes on
land rents.
Finally, this paper is also related to Koethenbuerger and Poutvaara (2006). Therein, the
focus is on the size of the pay-as-you-go social security system. A reduction in the social
security contribution rate increases future human capital stock, which is capitalized in the
current land prices. Under certain conditions, the capital gain for pensioners, resulting from
increased human capital formation, may exceed the cut in pensions, allowing for a Pareto-
improving social security reform. The government is restricted to tax wages. This paper,
3instead, allows the government to tax also land rents, in line with Rangel (2005).
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we introduce the model. In section
3 we analyze the welfare implications of a reform of the tax mix. We provide a concluding
discussion in section 4.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy whose population size is normalized at unity. In any period
t production combines three input factors: capital, labor and land. The amount of land is
normalized to unity. Labor and capital in the economy in period t are denoted by Lt and Kt,
respectively. The production function Yt = F(Lt;Kt) exhibits constant returns to scale in all
three factors. Capital is internationally mobile. All markets are competitive, and therefore
pro￿t maximization implies
wt = FLt(Lt;Kt); r = FKt(Lt;Kt): (1)
wt denotes the wage rate in period t and r is the interest rate determined in the international
capital market. The land rent in period t, Rt; is given as residual
Rt = F(Lt;Kt) ￿ FLt(Lt;Kt)Lt ￿ FKt(Lt;Kt)Kt: (2)
Individuals can invest their savings in the international capital market or the national
land market. We assume that foreigners do not invest in the national land market. Even with
integrated capital markets, full domestic land ownership could be guaranteed by foreigners
facing a small transaction cost if they were to buy domestic land. In line with Gordon
4Figure 1: Sequence of decisions.
and Bovenberg (1996), a transaction cost in foreign land acquisition might arise due to
asymmetric information on the part of investors. Such asymmetries tend to play a diminished
role in international loan markets. The economy produces a composite good, which is a
perfect substitute for that produced abroad. Rents are taxed at a rate ￿R < 1. By arbitrage,
land value in period t, Vt, is given by3
(1 + r)Vt = (1 ￿ ￿
R)Rt+1 + Vt+1. (3)
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which each cohort lives for two periods.
Since each cohort consists of homogenous households, we consider a representative household
for each cohort. The sequence of decisions is depicted in Figure 1. In the ￿rst period of their
life individuals born in period t choose their labor supply lt and savings invested in ￿nancial
assets st and land acquisition Vt from the old generation. In the second period of life,
individuals receive the rent payment Rt+1, sell land to the current young generation and use
the receipts along with the deaccumulation of ￿nancial assets st(1 + r) to ￿nance second-
period consumption c2
t+1. In addition to the rent tax ￿R, the government imposes a tax ￿w
3We save on notation by omitting time subscripts for the rent and wage tax rate.




t ￿ st ￿ Vt = 0 (4)
st(1 + r) + (1 ￿ ￿
R)Rt+1 + Vt+1 ￿ c
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t ￿;￿ > 0. (6)
We adopt a utility function that excludes income e⁄ects on labor supply; this simpli￿-
cation is in line with, e.g., Saez (2002) and Immervoll et al. (2007). Households can save
and borrow freely at the exogenous interest rate r, determined by the international capital
market in order to smoothen their consumption over their lifetime. Labor supply of the
young in period t follows from maximizing (6) subject to the budget constraints (4) and (5)
which yields
lt = ((1 ￿ ￿
w)wt)
￿ .
dlt=dwt > 0 since income e⁄ects on labor supply are absent. The elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate is equal to ￿.
Land price dynamics are captured by (3). Rearranging terms, all ￿price-dividend￿ratios
consistent with arbitrage behavior must satisfy the arbitrage condition (3). For any time
pro￿le of land prices Vt+i, i = 0;::;1, we have Rt = Rt+i = const: in a steady state. The
arbitrage equation (3) states that if Vt changes and Rt = Rt+i = const:, then Vt+1 will change
by the same amount as Vt, multiplied by 1 + r. Thus, (3) de￿nes Vt+1 as a function of Vt
with slope dVt+1=dVt = 1 + r > 1: The function (thick line) is illustrated in Figure 2. A
steady state Vt = Vt+1 = V ￿ exists. Furthermore, the steady state is unique and exhibits
6Figure 2: Steady state.
point stability. That is, for any value Vt 6= V ￿ the only adjustment in the land price which
is consistent with perfect foresight is an immediate jump to V ￿.
To relate the land price to the future net-of-tax land rents, we recursively substitute for





(1 + r)i .





Any change in land value following a tax reform in period t is captured by a jump in
net-of-tax land rents in the subsequent period. Finally, we note that the net foreign assets





￿T Ft+T+1 = 0
as each generation￿ s budget constraint is satis￿ed over its lifetime and r > 0.
3 Rent Tax Reform
We consider a rise in rent taxes at the beginning of period t; before the young generation
supplies labor and the current elderly sell their land to the young generation. The proceeds
are used to reduce the wage tax. The current young cohort and the newly born generations
bene￿t from the tax reform. They are subject to a lower wage tax and trade land at the
new steady state price. The current old cohort experiences a change in the value of land
holdings. To verify whether it is a gain or loss, we ￿rst de￿ne labor demand, capital demand
and the wage rate as a function of the wage tax. The ￿rst-order condition for capital demand
de￿nes Lt(Kt) and following (2) Rt(Kt). Via the ￿rst-order condition for labor demand, we
get wt(Kt). Inserting Lt(Kt) and wt(Kt) into the labor market clearing condition yields
























t(1 ￿ ￿w)dwt=dKt ￿ dLt=dKt
,
(8)
where ￿ := FKKFLL ￿F 2
KL > 0. Capital employment depends negatively on the level of
wage taxation, i.e. dKt=d￿w < 0. A higher wage tax discourages labor supply. Since labor
and capital are complements in production, this lowers the marginal productivity of capital
and thus leads to an out￿ ow of capital. Straightforwardly, the e⁄ect of the wage tax on labor
supply, dLt=dKt ￿ dKt=d￿w, and on the gross wage rate, dwt=dKt ￿ dKt=d￿w, is negative.
Capital employment is not in￿ uenced by the rent tax since income changes in response to a
4l0
t denotes the derivative of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate (1 ￿ ￿w)wt.
8hike in the rent tax do not a⁄ect labor supply.
The public sector budget constraint is Tt = ￿wwtLt + ￿RRt. Keeping tax revenues
constant, tax rates are related as5
d￿w
d￿R







@￿R = Rt > 0 and
@Tt









We consider an economy which is on the up-ward sloping part of the tax revenue hill,
@Tt=@￿w > 0. Otherwise, a trade-o⁄ between rent and wage taxes in terms of tax revenues
would not exist. A reduction in the wage tax rate would allow for a cut in the rent tax so
as to keep tax revenues constant. An intergenerational Pareto-improvement would trivially
follow. We denote the wage tax rate at which @Tt=@￿w = 0 by ￿w.
Using (7), (9) and (10) and invoking stationarity of land rents (Rt+1 = Rt) we can
compute the change in the net-of-tax rent payment and the land price in response to a
budget-balancing increase in the rent tax in period t:
d
￿

















The transition generation bene￿ts from the tax reform if and only if (11) is positive.
Resorting to a Cobb-Douglas production function with ￿ and ￿ (￿;￿ > 0; ￿ + ￿ < 1)
denoting the share of output accruing to labor and capital, we ￿nd:
Proposition. Consider an economy in which @Tt=@￿w > 0. There always exists an
5Concretely, the derivative is taken w.r.t. the tax rates in period t assuming that the tax rates stay at
the new levels in all subsequent periods. Since labor supply jumps to its new steady state level in period t
(and so do rents), a budget-balancing reform of the tax mix in period t also balances the public budget in
all subsequent periods.
9interval of wage tax rates (￿w;￿w), ￿w < ￿w and ￿w;￿w 2 (0;1), for which a change of the
tax mix from wage to rent taxation improves welfare of the transition generation .
The proof is relegated to the appendix. A rent tax lowers the land value and rental
income, ceteris paribus. The budget-balancing reduction in labor taxes, however, increases
labor supply. This, in turn, increases land productivity in the current and future periods.
This capitalizes in the land price and may compensate for the negative e⁄ect of higher rent
taxation, together with the current increase in land rents. In fact, a pre-existing labor tax
￿w > ￿w generates a su¢ ciently large distortion in the economy (being convex in the tax
rate) so as to render the net e⁄ect on land value and rental income positive. The tax reform
thereby raises welfare of the transition generation and of steady state generations. The upper
bound ￿w ensures that @Tt=@￿w > 0: Straightforwardly, for a level of wage taxes above ￿w
(and thus @Tt=@￿w < 0) it is feasible to lower both the wage and rent tax while leaving tax
revenues constant. As a result, current and future generations bene￿t from the reform. To
illustrate the scope for intergenerationally welfare-enhancing policies, consider
￿
￿;￿;￿;￿R￿
= (0:6;0:3;0:5;0:1). When evaluated subject to the condition @Tt=@￿w > 0 the range of
wage tax rates which sustain a Pareto-improvement is (￿w;￿w) = (0:67;0:71). The interval
extends to unity in the absence of the condition. Even though the minimum required tax
rate is high, it is of an empirically relevant magnitude, see Immervoll et al. (2007) who
compute the marginal tax rate on working for di⁄erent income deciles and countries.6
6Therein, the computed tax rate on working hours include income taxes, social security contributions and
the value-added tax.
104 Concluding Discussion
Governments can rely on various tax bases to ￿nance their expenditures. In the presence of
a ￿xed factor of production, taxing land rents would be the most e¢ cient way of ￿nancing
public expenditures from the perspective of steady-state generations. However, were a rent
tax to be established, its future tax revenues are capitalized in the current asset prices. This
creates a con￿ ict of interest between the current owners of land, and future generations.
In this paper, we show that rent taxation, when combined with a budget-balancing
reduction in wage taxes, may also bene￿t transition generations. The key mechanism here
is the endogeneity of labor supply. A cut in wage taxes increases current and future labor
supply, and this increases the income accruing to land, when land and labor are complements
in production. Provided that the initial wage taxes are su¢ ciently high, this increase in gross
rents may outweigh the e⁄ects of a moderate hike in the tax on land rents.
Our analysis relies on a simple analytical model, allowing for explicit solutions. One
restrictive assumption we make is that the labor supply in the second period of life is zero.
Relaxing this assumption would strengthen the case for the reform we analyze. If households
also supply labor in the second period of life (possibly partially as they retire in the course
of the second period), aggregate labor supply goes up. A reform of the tax mix towards
a higher rent taxation and a lower wage taxation induces larger adjustments in aggregate
labor supply. Thus, rent payments and the asset prices increase more strongly. Furthermore,
the transition generation enjoys a lower wage tax on its second period labor earnings. Both
e⁄ects widen the prospects of a Pareto-improving tax reform. A further assumption is
the simultaneous announcement and implementation of the reform, i.e. the reform is not
anticipated. The aligned timing is without loss of generality. If the reform is announced prior
to its implementation, the adjustment in the price of land and return on land takes place
earlier in time. If the adjustment is positive, the windfall gain is reaped by some generation
11preceding ￿our￿transition generation. Since labor supply is independent of income, this has
no e⁄ect on labor supply of the preceding generations. The result we derive stays intact.
It is also instructive to discuss the robustness of our results to the existence of alternative
distortionary taxes. For instance, a change from residence-based capital taxes (instead of a
wage tax) to rent taxes does not yield a Pareto-improvement. A higher return to savings
leaves in our model labor supply una⁄ected. Also, in a small open economy the capital
stock stays the same. Hence, the higher rent tax unambiguously lowers the wealth of the
transition generation. Di⁄erently, a shift from a source-based capital tax to a rent tax
suggestively yields similar e⁄ects as we have identi￿ed in the paper. A lower capital tax
yields an in￿ ow of capital and, since capital and labor are complements in production, it
also increases labor supply. Both e⁄ects capitalize in the price of land and counteract the
e⁄ect of a higher rent tax on asset wealth of the transition generation.7
Finally, incorporating income e⁄ects on labor supply may undermine the commonality
of interest between transitional generations and steady state generations. When leisure is
normal in consumption, a lower wage tax yields an income e⁄ect on labor supply which
runs against the substitution e⁄ect. On net, labor supply may still increase, but at a lower
magnitude. As such, the capitalization mechanism is less e⁄ective in transferring part of the
future welfare gains to the transition generation.
7In fact, the capitalization e⁄ect will be even stronger relative to the e⁄ect we obtain when wage taxes
are in place. The rationale is that capital is in perfectly elastic supply, while labor is in imperfectly elastic
supply.
12A Appendix: Proof of the Proposition
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d￿w < 0: (13)
Evaluating the responses di
dK, i = w;L;K (see (8)) for the Cobb-Douglas production
function Y = L￿K￿
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Inserting w = ￿L￿￿1K￿ and collecting terms
13Eq. (14) = ￿L
￿K
￿ + (￿
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Using the ￿rst-order condition for capital demand, r = ￿L￿K￿￿1, to substitute for K,
and rearranging yields

































Furthermore, labor supply is l = ((1 ￿ ￿w)wt)
￿. Substituting w by the ￿rst-order condition
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14Inserting (17) and (18) into (16) we get


































































Recall, provided @T=@￿w > 0 the sum of rental income and land value of the transitional
generation increases, d
￿
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We next derive the condition under which
@T









holds. As can be inferred from (12) the expression is almost congruent to the term
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d￿w + dR
d￿w which we stepwise rearranged to arrive at (20). Reiterating
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:
15Straightforwardly, ￿w < ￿w since ￿R < 1. A change in the tax mix from wage to rent
taxation increases land value if and only if ￿w 2 (￿w;￿w).




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿))





(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿))
2 > 0:




￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + !￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)!)￿











￿￿R (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + !￿) ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿R (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)!
￿
￿





￿ + ￿R (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
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w;￿
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To determine the maximal and minimal value of ￿w and ￿w, we ￿rst observe that
16lim
￿!0! = 0 (21)
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Given by (21) and (22)
lim
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1 ￿ ￿
2 (0;1):
Thus, ￿w;￿w 2 (0;1) which completes the proof.
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